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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Lawyers have lost their monopoly, and perhaps even their majority 
market share, of the provision of legal services. In the past, lawyers 
performed all legal and law-related services.1 However, in the modern 
economy, that role is rapidly disintegrating. Accountants and enrolled agents 
can now offer federal tax services, including some forms of legal 
representation, to the general public.2 Legal service providers, who provide 
document discovery and low cost bulk legal-related services to companies 
and law firms, now provide business clients with litigation support, 
document review, predictive coding, and business consulting at a fraction of 
the cost of traditional law firms.3 These legal service providers include 
Robert Half Legal, Pangea3, and Special Counsel. Some legal service 
providers, usually called legal process outsourcers, contract with entities 
outside the United States to outsource legal services.4 In search of novel, 
business process management and efficiency-driven services, corporate 
clients are deserting traditional law firms, or cutting back on “legal services,” 
in droves.5 
Commentators argue that American state-based prohibitions on 
lawyers partnering with nonlawyers are a major factor behind the market 
                                                 
1 John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services 
in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 110–12 (2000). 
2 Id. (discussing the monopoly of lawyers over “legal work and services” in the 
first half of the twentieth century). 
3 Rachel Zahorsky & William D. Henderson, Who’s Eating Law Firms’ Lunch, 
ABA J. (Oct 1, 2013), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
whos_eating_law_firms_lunch; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 104–05. 
4 Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3 (describing the outsourcing of legal 
services to China, India, and other rapidly developing markets). 
5 Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3; see Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, 
at 103–07 (noting that “legal services” has an evolving meaning). At heart, legal services 
means litigation work, transactional work, client representation by licensed lawyers, and all 
services ancillary or necessary to carry those services out. Ancillary services include 
document review, tax preparation and management, lobbying, discovery management, and 
management consulting. Such ancillary services may or may not be done by a lawyer. 
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changes, particularly increased competition by foreign law firms who can 
partner with nonlawyers.6 These concerns and the 2008 recession have 
encouraged the American Bar Association (ABA) to revisit the issue of 
multidisciplinary practices and alternative law practice structures (ALPSs). A 
multidisciplinary practice (MDP) is “[a] fee-sharing association of lawyers 
and nonlawyers in a firm that delivers both legal and non-legal services.”7 
ALPSs, in contrast, refer to business structures that have both lawyer and 
nonlawyer partners, but only deliver legal services.8 A law firm, on the other 
hand is “a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, Professional Corporation, 
sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers 
employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a 
corporation or other organization.”9 The term “law firm” will only be used 
throughout this article to refer to an entity completely composed of lawyers 
engaged in the practice of law. Alternative Business Structures is the term 
used in the United Kingdom for multidisciplinary practice structures 
permitted by the Legal Services Act 2007. The Legal Services Act permits 
business structures that engage in legal and non-legal services with certain 
restrictions.10 
This article argues that, contrary to assertions by some legal 
practitioners, state rules of professional conduct based on ABA Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 5.4 (Model Rule 5.4) may be liberalized to allow 
multidisciplinary practices, without undermining lawyer professionalism, 
confidentiality, or the professional independence of judgment.11 Furthermore, 
                                                 
6 Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3; Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 
103–07. 
7 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “multidisciplinary 
practice”). 
8 For Comment: Discussion Paper on Alternative Law Practice Structures, ABA 
COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, (Dec. 2, 2011) [hereinafter ALPS December Letter], available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-ethics 
2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf (noting the terminology used in this area is a 
constant source of confusion among scholars and the ABA Committees themselves). 
Unfortunately, even the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 is often not entirely clear when 
differentiating one type of entity from another. For example, the ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20 “clarifies” in their report that an ALPS is not a multidisciplinary practice.  
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (1983) (defining “law firm”).  
10 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 72 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/resource (defining “alternative business 
structure”); see Legal Profession Act 2004 (N.S.W.) s 134 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/lpa2004179/ (defining “incorporated legal 
practice”). 
11 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; ABA, Variations of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer (Feb. 12, 
2014) [hereinafter ABA, Variations], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_5_4.authcheckdam.pdf (detailing 
implementation of Model Rule 5.4 in the fifty states and District of Columbia). With the 
exception of the District of Columbia, Model Rule 5.4 has been implemented in almost every 
state in largely the same form. ABA, Variations. Some states have made minor changes to the 
rule to allow “fee sharing” with the estate of a deceased lawyer within certain parameters. Id. 
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the ABA can adopt the Consumer-Commercial-Contractual Model (CCC 
Model) as a liberalized, but professionalism-protective version of Model 
Rule 5.4. The CCC Model incorporates: (a) lawyer/nonlawyer partnership 
without passive nonlawyer investment, (b) consumer and commercial 
specific rules, and (c) professionalism protections. 
This article presents its argument in three parts. Part II provides a 
brief history of the prohibition on lawyer/nonlawyer partnership and Model 
Rule 5.4, including recent efforts to allow some form of multidisciplinary 
practices. Part III discusses possible models for prohibiting or regulating 
multidisciplinary practices, including ethical and practical concerns with 
current Model Rule 5.4. Finally, Part IV argues that the ABA may regulate, 
rather than prohibit, multidisciplinary practices while still protecting lawyer 
ethics and professionalism by adopting the CCC Model.  
 
II.  HISTORY 
 
A. Pre-1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
The legal profession has traditionally taken a two-pronged approach 
to nonlawyers and the protection of the practice of law.12 The first prong 
encompasses unauthorized practice of law provisions prohibiting nonlawyers 
from engaging in the practice of law.13 Such provisions have been common 
for at least a hundred years in many states.14 Most state professional rules 
mimic ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 governing the 
unauthorized practice of law.15 However, the “practice of law” is defined 
differently in each state.16 Most state statutes prohibit not only individuals 
from practicing law without a law license, but also corporations and other 
entity structures, because such structures may contain nonlawyer 
shareholders, members, etc.17 Enforcement of unauthorized practice of law 
statutes has been sporadic, although the ABA did maintain a Standing 
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law from 1930 until 1984.18 
The second prong includes rules prohibiting lawyers from partnering 
with or practicing with nonlawyers. Prohibitions on nonlawyer involvement 
in the “business of law,” including financial and managerial involvement, 
                                                                                                                   
However, the fee sharing prohibition for nonlawyers and nonlawyer partnerships has remained 
largely the same from state to state. Id. The current ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct will be referred to as “Model Rule 5.4” and “Model Rule 1.0.” 
12 Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who 
Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 579–82 (1989). 
13 Id. (discussing various state rules prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law). 
14 Id. (explaining the longevity of unauthorized practice of law rules). 
15 Id. (discussing state adoption of Model Rule 5.5). 
16 Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (describing the unauthorized 
practice of law); MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5. 
17 Andrews, supra note 12, at 579–82. 
18 Id. at 583–84. 
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appeared in the ABA Canons of Ethics in 1928.19 Canon 33 prohibited non-
licensed individuals from holding themselves out as legal practitioners.20 
Canon 34 prohibited division of fees between lawyers and nonlawyers, and 
Canon 35 provided that the professional services of a lawyer should not be 
controlled or exploited by a nonlawyer, non-law entity, or other 
intermediary.21 Between 1928 and the adoption of the ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility in 1969, these cannons were consistently 
construed by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances to 
prohibit lawyers and nonlawyers from offering legal services in almost all 
business forms.22 As non-incorporated forms of businesses exploded in the 
1960s and 70s, so too did the extension of lawyer-nonlawyer partnership 
prohibitions.23  
The Canons were replaced by the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility in 1969, which was quickly adopted in most states.24 Canons 
44, 34, and 33 became Disciplinary Rules (DR) 3-101(A), 3-102(A) and 
3 103(A).25 Additionally, DR 5-107(C) prohibits a professional corporation 
from directing or controlling the lawyer’s professional judgment, and DR 
5 107(B) prohibits a third party who pays for or employs a lawyer to render 
legal services for another from interfering with the lawyer’s professional 
judgment.26 The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
further expanded on the Disciplinary Rules with Informal Opinion 1241.27 
Informal Opinion 1241, when read in conjunction with Formal Opinion 303 
and the ABA Ethics Committee’s expansive definition of the practice of law, 
effectively prohibits a lawyer from operating any “kind of for-profit business 
organization in which a nonlawyer has a financial or managerial role, if the 
business of the organization is law or law-related.”28 
 
                                                 
19 Andrews, supra note 12, at 584–87 (discussing the ABA Canon of Ethics and 
history of lawyer-nonlawyer partnership prohibitions). 
20 Id. (describing Canon 33). 
21 Id. (discussing Canons 34 and 35). 
22 Id. at 586–88 (describing ABA Ethics Committee action on Model Rule 5.4); 
see, e.g., ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 297 (1961) (stating an 
accounting firm lawyer may represent the accounting firm, but may not provide legal advice 
to the firm’s clients); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 201 (1940) 
(indicating that representing clients in patent applications is the practice of law and that 
lawyers may not partner with nonlawyers to represent patent clients, even though the patent 
office permits nonlawyers to represent clients in patent application proceedings). 
23 Andrews, supra note 12, at 586–88. 
24 Id. at 588–92. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 592–94; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 
1241 (1973). 
28 Andrews, supra note 12, at 592–94; Informal Op. 1241, supra note 27. 
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B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 5.4 and the Kutak 
Commission 
 
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules).29 The Model Rules, with various amendments, have been 
adopted in all fifty states and the Model Rules have been amended fourteen 
separate times between 1983 and 2002.30 The ABA Commission on 
Evaluation of Professional Standards, known as the “Kutak Commission,” 
spent five years evaluating and revising the Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility.31 The Kutak Commission’s proposal on nonlawyer 
involvement in the practice of law, enshrined in Rule 5.4, proved to be the 
most controversial.32 The Kutak Commission Model Rule would have read 
as specified in Figure A below.33 
By its very terms, the rule would have allowed lawyers to partner in 
organizations in which a nonlawyer holds a management interest or where 
nonlawyers hold stock or interests of the organization.34 The Kutak 
Commission justified Rule 5.4 as a necessary change given the “complex 
variety of modern legal services” that make it unviable for the bar to define 
organizational forms that allegedly guarantee compliance with the ABA 
Rules of Professional Responsibility.35 Additionally, the Kutak Commission 
noted that exceptions to the legal service arrangements had “substantially 
eroded the general rule, leading to inconsistent treatment of various 
organizations on the basis of form or sponsorship.”36 
However, the ABA House of Delegates explicitly rejected the 
proposed Rule 5.4.37 The House of Delegates members opposed the Rule for 
several reasons: (1) interference with lawyer professional judgment; (2) the 
                                                 
29 Andrews, supra note 12, at 593. 
30 Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface.html; ABA, States 
Making Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption, 
Chronological Order (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_state_adopting_
model_rules.html. 
31 Robert W. Meserve, Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Commission on 
Evaluation of Professional Standards, Chair’s Introduction (Sep. 1983), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface/chair_introduction.html. 
32 Andrews, supra note 12, at 593–95. 
33 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (Proposed Final Draft 1981) 
[hereinafter Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibi
lity/kutak_5-81.authcheckdam.pdf; see infra Figure A. 
34 Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4 (explaining the contents of the rule). 
35 Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4 cmt. 
36 Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95. 
37 Id. at 595–96. A full transcript of the ABA House of Delegate Sessions 28, 37, 
and 45–48 in February 1983 has never been released. 
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possible corporate ownership and operation of law firms, by companies like 
Sears; (3) destruction of lawyer “professionalism;” and (4) other negative, 
but unknown effects, on the legal profession.38 In the Kutak Commission 
Rule 5.4’s place the House of Delegates adopted a substitute Model Rule 
based on the prior Model Code provisions.39 
 
C. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
Commission on Ethics 20/20: Missed Opportunities for Liberalization 
 
In August 1998, the ABA formed the Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice to further “study and report on the extent to which 
and the manner in which professional service firms operated by accountants 
and others who are not lawyers are seeking to provide legal services to the 
public.”40 The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, after much 
investigation, recommended to the ABA House of Delegates that the Model 
Rules be liberalized to allow for lawyers to partner with nonlawyers in 
business entities.41 Specifically, the Commission noted that there was already 
a trend toward legal and business services being offered in multidisciplinary 
entities and that present rules should not inhibit development of new business 
structures that provide better legal services and public access to the legal 
system.42 Furthermore, the Commission expressly recognized that lawyers 
already practice in settings with nonlawyers, including government legal 
departments and union sponsored prepaid legal service programs, and 
lawyers have maintained their professional independence in such settings.43 
The Commission’s recommendation was that lawyers be allowed to 
share fees and practice in concert with nonlawyers, subject to safeguards.44 
These safeguards included reiteration of lawyer independent judgment, clear 
disclosure to clients of the arrangement, limits of the representation and 
client protections, multidisciplinary practices being bound by the 
                                                 
38 Id.; see infra Part III (discussing ethical concerns with nonlawyer/lawyer 
partnerships raised by the 1983 ABA House of Delegates and others). 
39 Andrews, supra note 12, at 595–96; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 5.4. 
40 ABA, The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice: About the Commission, 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_ 
multidisciplinary_practice/mdp_abt_commission.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
41 Id. 
42 Robert A. Stein, Multidisciplinary Practices: Prohibit or Regulate?, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 1529, 1541–43 (2000) (describing in detail the recommendations of the Commission 
on Multidisciplinary Practice); M. Courtauld McBryde, The Future of Multidisciplinary 
Practices in North Carolina: Love ‘Em or Hate ‘Em, North Carolina’s Only Option Is to 
Regulate Them, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 202–04 (2001). 
43 Stein, supra note 42, at 1541–43; McBryde, supra note 42, at 202–04 
(discussing government legal departments and other professional settings where lawyers and 
nonlawyers work side by side). 
44  Stein, supra note 42, at 1542–43; McBryde, supra note 42, at 202–04. 
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Professional Rules, and conflict of interest rules to the same extent as 
traditional law firms. 45 
However, when the Commission’s recommendations reached the 
ABA House of Delegates in July 2002, the House unequivocally rejected the 
proposals as contrary to preserving the core values of the legal profession.46 
The ABA House of Delegates then passed Resolution 10F, which: (1) listed 
core values of the legal profession, including undivided loyalty to the client, 
independent judgment, client confidences, avoiding conflicts of interest, 
maintaining a single profession of law, and promoting access to justice; 
(2) encouraged state and local bar associations to vigorously enforce their 
professional rules, particularly those surrounding the definition of “practice 
of law;” (3) called upon the ABA Ethics Committee to draft rules regulating 
strategic and contractual alliances and regulations with nonlawyer service 
providers and organizations; (4) encouraged states who permit law firms to 
own nonlawyer businesses to develop rules prohibiting nonlawyers from 
owning and controlling the practice of law; and (5) discharged the ABA 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice. 47 
The Ethics 2000 Commission, created near the turn of the twenty-
first century to recommend broad changes to the ABA Model Rules, 
proposed very minimal changes to Rule 5.4.48 Section (a)(4) was added 
stating that: “a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit 
organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the 
lawyer in the matter.”49 In addition, section (d)(2) was revised to read: “a 
nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position 
of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a 
corporation.”50 Forty-four jurisdictions also created state committees or 
commissions to study the multidisciplinary practice issue, with mixed 
recommendations.51 However, after the ABA Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice was disbanded in 2000, most state-based 
initiatives were soon shelved or abandoned.52 
Unlike past committees and commissions on the topic of 
lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships, the Commission on Ethics 20/20 was the 
                                                 
45 Stein, supra note 42, at 1542–43; McBryde, supra note 42, at 202–04. 
46 McBryde, supra note 42, at 204. 
47 Louis H. Levinson, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Others: Coping with 
the ABA Model Rules After Resolution 10F, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 133, 142–43 (2001) 
(discussing Resolution 10F); ABA, MPD Recommendation—Center for Professional 
Responsibility (July 2000), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.html. 
48 ABA Ethics 2000 Comm’n, Rule 5.4, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_
commission/e2k_rule54.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).  
49 Id. (discussing revisions to Model Rule 5.4 after Resolution 10F). 
50 Id. 
51 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 7 (describing state action). 
52 Id. 
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first to propose a restrictive, yet liberalized, version of Rule 5.4 for ABA 
consideration.53 The work of the Commission on Ethics 20/20 Commission is 
ongoing, and the ABA House of Delegates has yet to vote on the 
Commission’s proposed rule.54 Commentators, however, indicate 
pessimistically that the Commission on Ethics 20/20 and ABA House of 
Delegates are unlikely to adopt a new Rule 5.4 anytime soon.55 
 
D. Current Model Rule 5.4 
 
Current Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
is substantially similar to the rule adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 
1983, with the changes made by the Ethics 2000 Commission to sections 
(a)(4) and (d)(2). Model Rule 5.4 has been adopted in some form in all fifty 
states.56 Model Rule 5.4 has been interpreted by the ABA Ethics Committee 
and state courts to prohibit nonlawyers from being partners or holding 
financial interests in law firms.57 Also, the rule implicitly prohibits the 
formation of publically traded law firms, because nonlawyers would be able 
to hold the traded shares.58 Nonlawyers may work as independent contractors 
or employees of a law firm, provided that such agreements comply with all 
state professional rules, including those governing fee sharing (Rules 5.4 and 
2.1) and supervision (Rules 5.1–5.3).59 
 Contemporary federal laws, including the Internal Revenue Code, 
have limited areas that constitute the “practice of law.” Nonlawyers, 
including accounting firms may now represent clients before the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office and tax courts provided that the meet the federal 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 See ABA, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on
_ethics_20_20.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) (noting that the ABA Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 is revising not only Model Rule 5.4, but other Model Rules as well, and has 
made substantial progress in those areas); James Podgers, Summer Job: Ethics 20/20 
Commission Shelves Nonlawyer Ownership, Focuses on Other Proposals, ABA J. (June 1, 
2012), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/summer_job_ethics 
_20_20_commission_shelves_nonlawyer_ownership/ (showing the Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 has shelved the nonlawyer ownership issue in favor of working on other 
proposals, at least for the time being).  
55  Podgers, supra note 54 (describing the ABA and Commission on Ethics 20/20 
deadlock on ALPSs and multidisciplinary structures). 
56 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (providing the number of states that 
have adopted Model Rule 5.4 in some form). 
57 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, ABA Formal Op. 01-
423 (Forming Partnerships with Foreign Lawyers); ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, ABA Formal Op. 03-430 (Propriety of Insurance Staff Counsel Representing 
the Insurance Company and its Insured; Permissible Names for an Association of Insurance 
Staff Counsel); ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, ABA Formal Op. 
95-392 (Sharing Legal Fees with a For Profit Corporate Employer). 
58 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–59. 
59 Id. 
9
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statutory requirements.60 Furthermore, lobbying firms, management and 
consulting firms, and investment banking firms have hired lawyers to 
provide services to their clients that often bestride the gap between 
nonlawyer business and investment services and the practice of law.61 
Although the organized bars of many states have attempted to crack down on 
the “unauthorized practice of law” by nonlawyers such as accounting firms, 
these efforts have been far outpaced by the growth of legal services providers 
and others providing law-related or quasi-legal services.62 
 
E. A Word on the Business-Profession Dichotomy 
 
Chief among the American and many state legal communities’ 
concerns regarding lawyer/nonlawyers partnership is the risk that the legal 
community will be seen as a “business” rather than as a “profession.”63 
These concerns are unfounded for two reasons. 
First, business and professional behavior are not fundamentally 
incompatible.64 Scholar Cindy Carson recognizes that a business and a 
profession are entities that seek to promote the greatest societal good, the 
former by maximizing profit and the latter by maximizing service.65 Profit 
maximization in a capitalist economy often takes the form of increasing the 
                                                 
60 Id. at 105–08; Formal Op. 201, supra note 22 (explaining that nonlawyers may 
appear before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, but a lawyer appearing before the same 
office is presumed to be engaged in the “practice of law”). 
61 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 105–08. 
62 See generally Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law: Who Is the Bar Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599, 599–629 
(2000) (discussing state bar attempts, often futile, to reign in the unauthorized practice of law 
by accounting firms) . 
63 Paul D. Clement, Comments of Nine General Counsel on the ABA Commission 
on Ethics 20/20’s Discussion Paper on Alternative Law Practice Structures (Feb. 29, 2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ 
ethics_20_20_comments/ninegeneralcounselcomments_alpschoiceoflawinitialdraftproposal.au
thcheckdam.pdf (expressing concerns regarding lawyer professionalism in light of any 
liberalization of Model Rule. 5.4); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 198–200 (noting 
scholars have criticized various legal professionalism movements throughout the twentieth 
and early twenty-first century as being smokescreens for “anti-Semitism, nativism, classism, 
economic protectionism, and general elitism”); see Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius 
Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse 
of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 2 (2005), 
available at http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context= 
scholarlyworks. It is unclear if modern profession/business concerns stem, at least partially, 
from the same roots. Andrews, supra note 12, at 616–17 (alleging that economic 
protectionism can be read between the lines of contemporary justifications to prohibit lawyers 
from practicing with nonlawyers). 
64 Russell G. Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can 
Learn from Rock and Roll, 14 WIDENER L.J. 907, 908–15 (2005) (recognizing and discussing 
the business-profession dichotomy). 
65 Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Mismanagement: The Problem of Non-
Lawyer Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593, 605–07 (1994). 
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quality of service provided to customers.66 Furthermore, a profession is 
simply defined as, “[a] vocation requiring advanced education and training” 
or “a type of job that requires special education, training, or skill.67 
Traditionally, medicine, law, and the ministry were the only true 
“professions.”68 However, that list has expanded substantially in the modern 
era due to the growth in jobs requiring advanced education, such as 
accounting and engineering.69 Noticeably absent from the professional 
definition is whether the enterprise must be for-profit or not-for-profit.70 In 
fact, modern law firms made up of “professionals” may be as engaged in the 
“unethical” business of making money as nonlawyer businesses.71 
Admittedly, a business is defined as, “[a] commercial enterprise 
carried on for profit; a particular occupation or employment habitually 
engaged in for livelihood or gain.”72 However, profit motive does not 
automatically equal propensity toward unethical conduct and deficient legal 
services.73 Undeniably, “business” considerations and behaviors, including 
                                                 
66 Leonard L. Berry et al., Improving Service Quality In America: Lessons 
Learned, 8 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 32 (1994), http://areas.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/ 
marketing/facultystaff/zeithaml/selected%20publications/improving%20service%20quality%2
0in%20america-%20lessons%20learned.pdf. 
67 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “profession”); 
PROFESSION, Merriam-Webster Online (last visited December 2, 2013), http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/profession?show=0&t=1386007280. 
68 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “profession”) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 20 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Mass. 1939) regarding the traditional 
vocations defined as “professions”). 
69 See, e.g., Business Professions, WIS. DEP’T OF SAFETY & PROF’L SERVS., 
http://dsps.wi.gov/Licenses-Permits/Credentialing/Business-Professions (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2013) (listing the different “business professions” that require a licensure in 
Wisconsin, including engineering and accounting); New York State Licensed Professions, 
N.Y. ED. DEP’T: OFFICE OF THE PROFESSIONS (Sept. 24, 2013) (listing the fifty professions 
requiring licensure in New York). It is ironic that Wisconsin juxtaposes business and 
profession in the same heading, when the business-professional dichotomy is so strong. 
Business Professions. It should be noted, however, that attorneys do not appear on either New 
York’s or Wisconsin’s list of professions, but rather are regulated by the court system. 
Business Professions; New York State Licensed Professions. 
70 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226, 1329 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “profession” and 
“business”). 
71 Andrews, supra note 12, at 601–03.  
72 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “business”). 
73 Andrews, supra note 12, at 601–03 (stating that: (1) the assumption “profit 
motive is bound to lead to inadequate or unethical legal services” has no empirical support and 
contradicts our society’s fundamental scheme of fulfilling consumer demand; (2) the 
assumption “corporations or laymen engage in the ‘sordid’ business of making money . . . 
more than . . . traditional law firms” misstates current private law firm practice and 
misrepresents the abilities of a current private law firms to seek money and current 
corporations to seek purposes other than money; and (3) the assumption that profit motive is 
incompatible with law “suffers from an over-simplistic, even arrogant, view of nonlawyers” 
because the assumption, in turn, assumes that nonlawyers will enter the law business for only 
one motive—to make money—and this sub-assumption stereotypes and ignores the fact that 
many lawyers enter the law profession to make money). In particular, the requirement under 
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economics of scale and efficient integration of services into a single product, 
can be beneficial to a law firm, as they are with any business.74 As everyday 
business activities become more intertwined with legal services, having a law 
firm that is run with the efficiency, profit-cognizance, and long-term 
planning of a business is not necessarily a bad thing.75 
Second, lawyers’ assumptions that a lawyer monopoly on the 
delivery of legal services is the only way to uphold the ethical standards of 
the profession are presumptuous.76 Nonlawyers can and do recognize the 
ethical rules and requirements of the legal profession.77 Indeed, many 
nonlawyers are required to follow and uphold state ethical standards and 
professional codes of conduct for their own business professions.78 Many 
nonlawyers such as accountants and engineers have their own 
professionalism statutes or rules of ethics, additional training requirements, 
and examination requirements.79 Thus, suggesting that nonlawyers, simply 
by virtue of being nonlawyers, cannot separate morality from money is  
inapposite.80 
Fears that multidisciplinary practice will herald the end of the legal 
community as a profession are inconsistent with the realities of what 
constitutes a “profession” versus a “business” in contemporary times. 
                                                                                                                   
Sarbanes-Oxley that many publically traded businesses create and implement corporate codes 
of ethics seems to suggest that businesses and their partners, officers, and employees are 
bound to a certain minimal standard of “business ethics.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–29, 249 (2003) 
(Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
74 Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?: A Comparative 
Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the United States, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom After the Disintegration of Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 589, 599 (2002); but see Carson, supra note 65, at 602–04 (suggesting that any monetary 
savings through more efficient management of an entity providing legal services would go to 
partners and the entity, rather than be passed on to clients and consumers). 
75 Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3. Indeed, as mentioned supra, many 
business clients are now demanding business like efficiency from their sources of legal 
services and are turning to legal service providers when traditional law firms do not provide 
the efficiency they seek. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text (noting increasing 
demand for efficient solutions in legal services, not just competency). 
76 Farrell, supra note 62, at 626–28. 
77 Id. (discussing nonlawyers’ adherence and acknowledgement of the legal rules 
of ethics and professional conduct). 
78 Id. 
79 See AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, AM. INST. OF CPAS (Oct. 31, 2013), 
available at http://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/codeofconduct/pages/default.aspx 
(accountant ethics code); Continuing Education: Professional Engineering and Land 
Surveying, N.Y. STATE ED. DEP’T: OFFICE OF THE PROFESSIONS (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/pels/peceques.htm (describing continuing education 
requirements for professional engineers and land surveyors in New York); Professional 
Engineer—Continuing Education, WIS. DEP’T OF SAFETY AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICES (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2013), http://dsps.wi.gov/Licenses-Permits/Engineer/PECE (discussing 
continuing education requirements for Wisconsin engineers). 
80 Farrell, supra note 62, at 26–28; Andrews, supra note 12, at 601–03 (terming 
the profession-business incompatibility argument to be an “over-simplistic, even arrogant 
view of nonlawyers”). 
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III.  MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE AND ALTERNATIVE 
DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURES 
 
The problem of multidisciplinary practice structures has spawned 
many different models for regulating and structuring such business entities. 
The models can be roughly broken up into three categories: (1) models 
without a formal business structure change; (2) models permitting nonlawyer 
partnership and passive investment; and (3) models permitting only 
nonlawyer partnership.81 Part III discusses the models in detail and briefly 
indicates why each model is inadequate to address the problem of 
multidisciplinary practices. 
 
A. Models Without a Formal Business Structure Change 
 
The category of models without a formal business structure change 
includes MDP models that do not require lawyers or a law firm to change the 
business structure (e.g., partnership, limited liability company, etc.) in which 
they practice.82 These models include: (1) the cooperation or “status quo” 
model and (2) the ancillary business services and contract/joint venture 
models. All of these models work largely within the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct in its current form and interpretation by state courts.83  
 
1. Cooperation or “Status Quo” Model 
 
The cooperation or “status quo” model maintains Model Rule 5.4 in 
its current form.84 The arrangement, as previously stated, allows law firms to 
hire nonlawyers as independent contractors or employees.85 However, 
nonlawyers cannot hold partnership or similar management interests in a law 
firm and cannot be passive investors in such an entity.86 Under this model, 
the nonlawyers’ services can be bundled with the lawyer’s services under the 
                                                 
81 Many of these models are drawn from models created by the ABA 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Model numbers 
are noted where relevant. See ABA, Hypotheticals and Models (March 1999) [hereinafter 
ABA, Hypotheticals and Models], available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_p
ractice/multicomhypos.html; see also Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–72 
(laying out the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice models in detail and briefly 
describing pitfalls and challenges with each).  
82 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (discussing Models 1–4). 
83 Id. (indicating that Models 1–4 work largely within the current professional 
rules of conduct). 
84 Id. (Model 1); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58 (discussing the 
advantages and pitfalls of Model 1). 
85 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58. 
86 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1). 
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heading of “legal services.”87 The nonlawyers’ services must be intimately 
related to the lawyer’s services, and the client cannot pay solely for the 
nonlawyers’ services uncoupled from the lawyer’s legal fees.88  
Additionally, lawyers in the cooperative model are responsible under 
Model Rule 5.3 to supervise the work of nonlawyers to make sure that the 
“person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer,” including attorney-client privilege and confidentiality.89 
Furthermore, despite the fact that a lawyer may not have an understanding of 
the nonlawyers’ area of expertise, the lawyer must also supervise the 
nonlawyer to ensure that the nonlawyer performs his or her duties with a 
minimum level of competence.90 Unquestionably, this imposes a high level 
of liability on the lawyer for any misconduct or lack of knowledge of their 
“subordinate” but highly skilled nonlawyer employees.91 Additionally, 
because nonlawyers cannot be partners in law firms, law firms are less able 
to attract top talent with lucrative salary packages or raise funds through 
sales of equity.92 Finally, as can be seen from the changing market for legal 
services, the status quo model places law firms at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-a-vis business service firms that are not bound by the restrictions and 
Professional Rules of lawyers.93 
 
2. Ancillary Business Services Model and Contract/Joint Venture Models 
 
Similarly to the status quo model, the ancillary business services and 
contract/joint venture models are based on options available under the 
existing Model Rules.94 However, unlike the status quo model, these 
methods of collaboration are far less common because they are on the fringes 
                                                 
87 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58. 
88 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 154–56.  
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b); ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, 
supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58  
90 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra 
note 1, at 154–56 (showing that, depending on viewpoint, this duty to supervise for minimal 
competence may not be much of an extension of state law primary liability for negligent 
supervision, but it is still a significant burden for the legal professional to bear). 
91 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58. 
92 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 153–58 (discussing nonlawyer 
compensation in law firms). 
93 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 1); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–58 (describing the competitive disadvantage of law firms under 
the status quo model). 
94 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60 (discussing the joint venture and ancillary business services 
models loosely based on Model 3) 
14
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss3/6
2014] PROTECTING THE PROFESSION 579 
 
of what is permissible under the professional rules of most states.95 Thus, 
these methods present risk management and liability concerns for law firms, 
often with far too little benefit.96 
 The ancillary business service model is based on Model Rule 5.7.97 
Under the model, a law firm may own an interest in a firm that provides non-
legal services, such as a real estate broker.98 The law firm may refer clients to 
the “ancillary” non-legal firm for various services, and conversely, the 
ancillary firm will refer clients to the law firm for legal services.99  
 Similarly, the contract and joint venture models involve varying 
levels of collaboration through contractual relationships between a law firm 
and another legal or non-legal entity.100 Frequently, these contractual 
relationships involve joint advertising.101 Law firms may also join together in 
“legal services networks” that agree to refer clients to one another when 
another firm has better regional or subject matter expertise.102 
However, a significant disadvantage of both the ancillary and 
contract/joint venture models are that the law firm may be required to 
supervise the activities of the ancillary or other firm if the services are “not 
distinguishable from legal service.”103 The law firm may also risk liability if 
fee separation and clear lines of corporate authority are not maintained 
between the law firm and nonlawyers business involved in the 
                                                 
95 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60. 
96 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60 (explaining the significant professional liability risks of 
adhering to Model 3). 
97 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60. 
98 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60 (describing law firms holding interests in nonlawyer entities 
and the significant risks involved). 
99 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 3); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60. 
100 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 163–70 (stressing the collaborative aspects of these models). 
101 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 163–70. 
102 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 163–70; Two possible examples of this type of arrangement are the 
Lex Mundi organization and DLA Piper’s “strategic alliance” partnership with the Cohen 
Group, a business consulting firm. See About Lex Mundi, LEX MUNDI, 
http://www.lexmundi.com/lexmundi/About_Lex_Mundi.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2014); see 
also The Cohen Group, DLA PIPER, http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/aboutus/in-the-united-
states/the-cohen-group/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). DLA Piper Global is itself an example of 
the contractual and auxiliary models at work, given its numerous “member” or partner entities 
that are separately organized and regulated throughout the world. Some entities operate under 
the DLA Piper name, and some do not. See DLA Piper Global, Legal Notices, 
http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/footer/legalnoticespage/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2014). 
103 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70. 
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arrangement.104 Indeed, Model Rule 5.3 extends supervisory responsibility to 
lawyers for all “nonlawyer[s] employed or retained by or associated with a 
lawyer.”105 This liability may extend to nonlawyer firm violations of the fee 
referral, confidentiality, and advertising Professional Rules, among others.106 
Furthermore, many law firms prefer to merge with another law firm to 
maintain a unified firm culture and cohesive work product, rather than work 
with multiple firms with uneven policies and work product.107 And finally, 
all of these models are problematic in that they assume a one-for-one or 
equal exchange of referrals between the two firms. In reality, that type of 
relationship is rare.108 
 
B. Models Permitting Nonlawyer Partnership and Passive Investment 
 
Models permitting both nonlawyer partnership and nonlawyer 
passive investment (multidisciplinary firms) are the trend in the worldwide 
legal profession.109 In the past, the ABA considered and rejected the Kutak 
Commission Model, which would have liberalized Model Rule 5.4 to allow 
multidisciplinary practices. Outside of the United States, Britain has adopted 
significant statutory modifications allowing such business combinations. 
 
1. The Kutak Commission Model Rule 
 
As previously mentioned, the Kutak Commission was tasked with a 
complete revision of the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct.110 As part of 
those revisions, the Kutak Commission proposed a new Rule 5.4, which 
would have allowed lawyers to practice in full multidisciplinary practices.111 
                                                 
104 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3-4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70 (analyzing fee sharing and liability risks with both 
models). 
105 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, 
supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70. 
106 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70. 
107 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 165–67 (explaining the law firm “culture” concerns not 
satisfied by auxiliary and contractual arrangements). 
108 ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Models 3–4); Dzienkowski & 
Peroni, supra note 1, at 157–60, 163–70. 
109 See Susan Hackett, Business as (Un)usual: Reengineering Legal Professional 
Training, Development, and Competency to Remain Relevant to Clients, Hot Topics Seminar, 
Business Law Inst., Hamline Univ. School of Law (Sept. 27, 2013) (discussing significant 
changes in the training and structure of the legal profession, including the increased relevancy 
of multidisciplinary practices and firms that provide more than just legal work).  
110 See supra Part II.B (discussing the Kutak Commission). 
111 Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4, supra note 33. The Kutak 
Commission Model is roughly equivalent to Model 5 in the ABA Commission’s 
Hypotheticals and Models. ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 81 (Model 5); 
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The proposed Kutak Commission Model Rule would have allowed full 
multidisciplinary practices, including lawyer/nonlawyer partnership in firms, 
and passive financial investment by nonlawyers in law firms.112 
However, such a structure raises significant ethical and professional 
concerns.113 Firstly, such an arrangement would undermine lawyer 
independent judgment, a requirement of Rules 1.7 and 1.8(f).114 Secondly, 
there is concern regarding the application of lawyer confidentiality (Rule 
1.6); disqualification (Rules 1.7–1.8); advertising (Rules 7.1–7.5) and other 
state professional rules to nonlawyers and within lawyer/nonlawyer 
partnerships.115 Lastly, the legal community fears that allowing such 
arrangements will undermine the legal community as a “profession,” as 
opposed to a “business,” leading to commercialization and corporatization of 
the legal profession.116 
 
a. Interference with Independent Professional Judgment 
 
The most frequent argument made by critics of multidisciplinary 
practices is that such arrangements will interfere with the lawyer’s 
independent professional judgment.117 Primarily, the argument is that a 
nonlawyer corporation or partner will control litigation or transactional work 
by a lawyer and how money earned from that representation is distributed.118 
As Thomas Andrews has noted, “[t]he possibility of interference with a 
lawyer’s independent judgment cannot be denied.”119 However, as 
proponents of multidisciplinary practices indicate, this risk may be 
overstated.120 Very tellingly, many lawyers already work in structures where 
their independent professional judgment may be impaired or directed by 
                                                                                                                   
Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72 (discussing Model 5, the fully integrated 
services model). 
112 Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4, supra note 33; ABA, Hypotheticals 
and Models, supra note 81 (Model 5); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72. 
113 Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra 
note 81 (Model 5); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72 (discussing significant 
opposition by the ABA House of Delegates to the Kutak Commission Final Draft Rule 5.4). 
114 Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, supra 
note 81 (Model 5); Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 171–72. 
115 Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95 (explaining the major unknown application 
of other model rules of professional conduct under a MDP structure). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 605. 
118 In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910) (explaining the 
concern that nonlawyers may interfere with litigation direction and monetary management). 
119 Andrews, supra note 12, at 606–07. 
120 Id. (arguing that the risk of interference with the independent judgment of a 
lawyer may be overstated and oversimplified). 
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others, such as in-house counsel and non-partner lawyers in law firms.121 
However, ethical lapses by such lawyers have been rare.122 
Furthermore, law firm capitalization and the issue of passive 
investment in law firms frequently comes up as an independence of 
professional judgment concern.123 The modification of law firm 
capitalization and financial structures, and the numerous practical, logistical, 
and ethical issues implicated, are beyond the scope of this paper.124 As the 
Kutak Commission itself noted, “[t]o prohibit all intermediary arrangements 
is to assume that the lawyer’s professional judgment is impeded by the fact 
of being employed by a lay organization . . . . The assumed equivalence 
between employment and interference with the lawyer’s professional 
judgment is at best tenuous.”125 
 
b. Application of the Rules of Professional Conduct Within a 
Multidisciplinary Practice 
 
Another crucial concern regarding multidisciplinary practices is how 
the state professional rules would apply to such entities.126 Most of the 
organized bar recognizes and agrees that nonlawyers should be subject to the 
state professional rules when they provide services in connection with legal 
services.127 However, the answer is considerably hazy when the nonlawyers 
are providing nonlegal services only.128 
                                                 
121 Id. (discussing lawyer-nonlawyer cooperation in corporations and nonpartner 
lawyers). 
122 Id. at 608 (noting an exception, the case of Enron, where in-house counsel may 
have been complicit in the fraud perpetuated by senior management); Ameet Sachdev, 
Enron’s Attorneys Criticized in Report: Evidence Found of Malpractice Examiners Say, 
CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2003), articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-11-28/ 
business/0311280188_1_neal-batson-enron-law-firms (describing possible Enron attorney 
malpractice); See NANCY B. RAPOPORT, JEFFREY D. VAN NIEL & BALA G. DHARAN, ENRON 
AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL Reader (2nd Ed.) (chronicling 
ethical issues inherent in the collapse of Enron from a variety of perspectives). 
123 Andrews, supra note 12, at 608. 
124 Indeed, an entire paper could be written just on the issue of passive investment 
in law firms and law firm long term capitalization and financing. This article will accept the 
view shared by many in the legal community that passive investment by nonlawyers is 
unnecessary and could potentially be detrimental to the legal profession. But cf. Tyler Cobb, 
Note, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too! Appropriately Harnessing the Advantages of 
Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 765 (2012) (discussing the benefits of law firm 
passive investment). 
125 Andrews, supra note 12, at 594–95 (quoting the “legal background” section of 
the Kutak Commission Report). The ABA Kutak Commission Report is no longer available 
through the ABA website.  
126 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 170–78 (describing concerns and 
confusion as to how other Model Rules would apply to MDPs). 
127 Id. at 174–75 (suggesting that nonlawyers should be subject to the legal rules 
of professional conduct, at least to the extent that they provide nonlegal services incident to 
legal services). 
128 Id. at 174–78. 
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Chief among the concerns is how lawyer rules of confidentiality, 
advertising, and attorney client privilege will apply, if multidisciplinary 
practices are permitted.129 The main fear is that confidentiality and attorney-
client privilege will be dead letter in an entity where lawyers and nonlawyers 
freely share information.130 However, compliance with confidentiality and 
attorney-client privilege should not be as significant a concern as detractors 
would have it be.  Rather, lawyers have been able to consult with and employ 
nonlawyers for years in various capacities to assist with presentation of 
litigation and other legal work.131 Confidentiality and attorney-client 
privilege have been maintained, with rare exceptions.132 Thus, with the 
appropriate modifications to the professional rules and interpretation by state 
courts, confidentiality and attorney-client privilege ethical concerns may be 
addressed and mitigated. Having nonlawyers sign confidentially agreements 
may also be an option.133 Similarly, advertising by multidisciplinary firms, 
like with lawyers, can be regulated by the state bars, mitigating but not 
eliminating ethical concerns in that area.134 
 
c. The Business-Profession Dichotomy Revisited 
 
Lastly, practitioners have alleged that allowing lawyers to partner 
with nonlawyers will diminish the professionalism and professional image of 
the legal profession.135 The New York Bar has alleged that “MDPs ‘would 
place lawyers in the ethically untenable position of allowing services to be 
offered without client protections. In New York, we won’t allow profit to 
replace principle as the touchstone of our profession.”136 As scholars and 
practitioners have recognized, nonlawyer “unethicalness” is a legal fiction.137 
Little evidence exists that nonlawyers are driven solely by a desire to make 
money, as indicated in Part II.E.138 
Additionally, the legal community, particularly smaller firms and 
solo practitioners, allege that allowing nonlawyers, including corporations 
and business entities, to invest in law firms would lead to Sears and other 
retailers opening law firms in their stores.139 The smaller practitioners fear 
that competition from corporate-run firms would drive smaller firms and solo 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 174–78. 
133 Cobb, supra note 124, at 774–76 (suggesting confidentiality agreements as an 
option to address confidential concerns). 
134 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 174–78. 
135 Andrews, supra note 12, at 600–03; Carson, supra note 65, at 605–07.  
136 McBryde, supra note 42, at 205 (quoting the New York State Bar Association 
President). 
137 Andrews, supra note 12, at 600–03. 
138 Id. 
139 Cobb, supra note 124, at 770–71. 
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firms out of business.140 This corporate-competition fear has become known 
as the “fear of Sears.”141 Small legal practitioners argue corporately owned 
law firms would lead to a diminution in the prestige and image of the 
profession.142 This assessment may or may not be accurate. Results have 
been mixed for corporate-owned professional structures, including 
optometrists and physicians.143 
Finally, it should be noted with caution that at least some members 
of the bar as far back as the Canons for Professional Ethics drafting 
committee doubted whether multidisciplinary practices and 
lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships even present threats detrimental to 
maintaining an ethical profession.144 However, given the foregoing 
discussion, this assessment, is probably incorrect. 
 
2. British Statutory Action 
 
In the past decade, Great Britain and Australia have both adopted 
rules permitting multidisciplinary practices. Feedback regarding such rules, 
at least from initial assessments, has been positive.145 For the sake of 
simplicity, this paper will only consider the British Model, as the ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 has recognized it to be the most relevant for 
creating a comparable ABA model.146 
The Legal Services Act of 2007 allows lawyers to develop 
alternative business structures (ABSs) with nonlawyers, and provide legal 
and nonlegal services within those structures in England.147 A nonlawyer 
may work actively for the business as a partner or hold a passive investment 
interest in the ABS.148 Significantly, in most cases, an entity that wishes to 
have nonlawyer and lawyer partners must register and be licensed with the 
relevant legal regulatory body, and that body must approve nonlawyer 
                                                 
140 Id.; Interview with Steven G. Brady, CEO, Minnesota Lawyers Mutual, in 
Minneapolis, Minn. (March 28, 2014) (discussing small firm and solo practitioner concerns 
regarding corporate ownership of law firms). These concerns include corporate-owned law 
firms driving down fees for services provided primarily by solo and small firms. Such 
concerns are similar to those raised by “Mom and Pop” stores against entities such as Wal-
Mart. 
141 Cobb, supra note 124, at 770–71 (discussing the “Fear of Sears” argument). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 769 (quoting several members of the Canon’s drafting committee who 
expressed doubts that lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships were inherently unethical). 
145 Matthew W. Bish, Note, Revising Model Rule 5.4: Adopting A Regulatory 
Scheme That Permits Nonlawyer Ownership and Management of Law Firms, 48 WASHBURN 
L.J. 669 (2009) (discussing the profitability of Australian and British law firms that have 
moved to a multidisciplinary practice structure). 
146 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8 (discussing the British ABS model). 
147 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, § 72 (U.K.), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 
ACTS/acts2007/en/ukpgaen_20070029_en_ 1 (last visited Aug. 10, 2014); Bish, supra note 
145, at 680–81.  
148 Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90 (describing the Legal Services Act of 2007). 
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partners who hold above a certain percentage interest in the entity.149 Thus, 
Britain has effectively brought such nonlawyers, and the British law firm 
entities themselves, under direct supervision of the state legal regulatory 
authorities.150 Additionally, the model also includes a limitation on the 
percentage interest a nonlawyer may hold.151 This limitation is based on the 
strong, but questionable assumption that lawyers must retain majority control 
of a legal entity in order to ensure the partners in that entity comply with the 
professional rules.152 As with all multidisciplinary practice models, the 
British model does include a qualifier expressly requiring that nonlawyer 
partners not interfere with a lawyer’s ethical duties, including independent 
professional judgment.153 
British legislators believe that reducing the restrictions on legal 
business structures will lead to a more consumer-friendly, flexible 
environment.154 The legislature also posits that the structures will lead to 
more comprehensive services and reduce transaction costs through “one-stop 
shopping.”155 Furthermore, the availability of nonlawyers holding stock 
options and other types of nonlawyer capital investment will theoretically 
allow firms to attract the best talent and conduct better long-term capital 
structuring of the firm.156  
The Legal Services Act of 2007 has also spurred renewed litigation 
in the United States by firms such as Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, who wish to 
merge with larger U.K. firms to develop global practices.157 The effect that 
such litigation will have on the development of Rule 5.4 in jurisdictions such 
as New York and Connecticut is unknown at this time. Unfortunately, even 
with the moderate number of entities reincorporating under British ABSs, it 
is too soon to tell what the ultimate ethical effects of such entities will be on 
the British legal environment.158 
 
C. Models Permitting Only Nonlawyer Partnership 
 
Several models, including the command and control model (D.C. 
Rule 5.4) and the Commission on Ethics 20/20 model would liberalize 
                                                 
149 Id.; Legal Services Act (explaining registration and licensing requirements 
under the Legal Services Act of 2007). 
150 Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90; Legal Services Act. 
151 Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90; Legal Services Act (explaining the percentile 
limitation). 
152 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing the reasons behind a 
percentage cap on nonlawyer interests). 
153 Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90; Legal Services Act. 
154  Bish, supra note 145, at 680–90. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the Appellate Div., 88 Fed 
App’x 526, 526–27 (2nd Cir. 2012). 
158 Bish, supra note 145, at 669–70. 
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Model Rule 5.4 to allow nonlawyers to “partner” with lawyers in business 
entities. “Partner” in this context means that the nonlawyer may hold a 
financial or managerial interest, often a partnership or LLC membership 
interest, in an organization engaged in the practice of law.159 
 
1. The Command and Control Model (D.C. Rule 5.4) 
 
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (D.C. Rule 5.4) is 
unique among state professional rules in that it is the only state rule to allow 
some form of nonlawyer partnership.160 D.C. Rule 5.4 requires that 
nonlawyers be active participants in the firm, prohibiting passive 
investment.161 Furthermore, the rule requires that lawyers take full ethical 
and professional responsibility for the actions of their nonlawyer partners.162 
This responsibility and liability is not a major change from the situation 
under the status quo model.163 However, it still does not address the 
underlying problem that the organized bar is regulating only the lawyers in 
such a partnership, and only indirectly monitoring the nonlawyers and entity 
itself.164 As the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 has recognized, a 
significant problem with the D.C. Rule is the unknown liabilities involved in 
converting to such a form if a law firm practices in states other than D.C.165 
As such, D.C. Rule 5.4 has not been adopted by many firms and only by 
smaller firms.166 Thus, additional ethical concerns are hard to ascertain given 
the small number of test cases.167 These problems are not easily solved 
absent reform by other states. 
 
                                                 
159 See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act § 110, cmt. subsection (d), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/limited%20liability%20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf (discussing ultra-
contractarianism and RULLCA’s rejection of that prospective). 
160 D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4; ABA, Hypotheticals and Models, 
supra note 81 (Model 2). 
161 Cobb, supra note 124, at 783–84 (noting the rule specifically states that, “[a] 
lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a financial 
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs 
professional services which assist the organization in providing legal services to clients,” 
provided that certain conditions are met). 
162 D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b)(3). 
163 See supra Part III.A.1. (discussing the status quo model). 
164 See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b)(2) (stating that “[a]ll persons 
having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest undertake [must] abide by 
these Rules of Professional Conduct,” but not subjecting nonlawyers to the jurisdiction of 
legal disciplinary authorities). 
165 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 6–10. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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2. The Commission on Ethics 20/20 Model 
 
Finally, the Commission on Ethics 20/20 has recently put forth a 
proposed model for consideration by the ABA House of Delegates and 
American Bar. The proposed model incorporates many features of D.C. Rule 
5.4 and the British ABSs.168 These features include: (1) a limitation of the 
services offered by an ALPSs to legal services; (2) a restriction that 
nonlawyers be active participants in the entity, not passive investors; (3) a 
percentage cap on nonlawyer interests in the firm; and (4) a “fit to own” 
requirement for nonlawyers.169 The active participation element has been 
otherwise addressed above.170 
As previously mentioned, the percentage cap on nonlawyer 
ownership is meant to keep ownership of the law firm in the hands of 
lawyers, rather than nonlawyers. After numerous discussions, the 
Commission has proposed a cap of twenty-five percent on nonlawyer 
interests, via a complicated formula, as sufficient to maintain lawyer control 
of the entity.171 The feeling is that keeping lawyers in control of the entity 
will allow lawyers to maintain the ethical integrity of the lawyers and 
nonlawyers in the firm.172 As previously mentioned, whether that reasoning 
is sound is an unanswered question.173 
On the other hand, the fit to own requirement is a new feature of 
ABA proposed models. The fit to own provision requires that lawyers in the 
firm execute some due diligence to ascertain the ethical character of 
proposed nonlawyer partners and keep records of such investigation.174 
However, as the Commission’s report recognizes, this requirement may not 
go far enough because it does not bring nonlawyers under the disciplinary 
authority of the state bars, and indeed does not even subject them to 
investigation by the state character and fitness committee.175 Rather, the 
proposed rule again places all responsibility on lawyers in the firm, which 
may or may not be ethically and practically realistic.176 
As discussed with the British Model and D.C. Rule 5.4 Model, the 
proposed rule features significant benefits, including requiring that 
nonlawyers follow the legal professional rules and protecting independent 
                                                 
168 See ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10. 
169 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, Draft Resolution 2. 
170 See supra Part III.A–B (discussing the active participation component of some 
suggested model rules). 
171 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10. 
172 Id. 
173 See supra Part II.E (discussing the business-profession dichotomy); Cobb, 
supra note 124, at 790 (calling the twenty-five percent cap “seemingly arbitrary”). 
174 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10; Cobb, supra note 124, at 790–
92. 
175 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 5–10; Cobb, supra note 124, at 790–
92. 
176 Cobb, supra note 124, at 790–92 (discussing division of liability exposure). 
23
Groth: Protecting the Profession
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014
588 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:565 
professional judgment.177 However, the modest improvements in the 
proposal may not justify the mechanical and restrictive rule structure.178 
Indeed, the MDP issue, including the Commission on Ethics 20/20 proposal, 
has been so contentious that the ABA has failed even to develop policy on 
the issue.179 Unfortunately, revisions to Rule 5.4 are stuck on a proverbial 
merry-go-round between the Ethics Committees and ABA House of 
Delegates, a journey that likely will not end soon.180 
 
Figure A. 
ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 5.4 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not 
share legal fees with a nonlawyer, 
except that: 
(1) an agreement by a lawyer 
with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or 
associate may provide for the 
payment of money, over a 
reasonable period of time after the 
lawyer's death, to the lawyer’s estate 
or to one or more specified persons; 
(2) a lawyer who purchases the 
practice of a deceased, disabled, or 
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to 
the estate or other representative of 
that lawyer the agreed-upon 
purchase price; 
(3) a lawyer or law firm may 
include nonlawyer employees in a 
compensation or retirement plan, 
even though the plan is based in 
whole or in part on a profit-sharing 
arrangement; and 
(4) a lawyer may share court-
awarded legal fees with a nonprofit 
The Kutak Commission Proposed 
Rule 5.4 
A lawyer may be employed by an 
organization in which a financial 
interest is held or managerial 
authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, 
or by a lawyer acting in a capacity 
other than that of representing clients, 
such as a business corporation, 
insurance company, legal services 
organization or government agency, 
but only if the terms of the 
relationship provide in writing that: 
(a) there is no interference 
with the lawyer’s 
independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-
lawyer relationship; 
(b) information relating to 
representation of a client is 
protected as required by rule 
1.6; 
(c) the arrangement does not 
involve advertising or 
personal contact with 
prospective clients prohibited 
by rules 7.2 and 7.3; and 
                                                 
177 Id. at 790-98. 
178 Id. (suggesting that further alterations to the Commission rule need to be 
made). 
179 James Podgers, ABA Ethics Opinion Sparks Renewed Debate over Nonlawyer 
Ownership of Law Firms, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/aba_ethics_opinion_sparks_renewed_debate_ov
er_nonlawyer_ownership_of_law_fi/ (discussing recent ABA action, or rather inaction, on 
Rule 5.4). 
180 Id. (noting more than one commentator laments that action on Rule 5.4 may 
necessarily come from the states, rather than national-level policy from the ABA). 
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organization that employed, retained 
or recommended employment of the 
lawyer in the matter. 
(b) A lawyer shall not form a 
partnership with a nonlawyer if any 
of the activities of the partnership 
consist of the practice of law. 
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a 
person who recommends, employs, 
or pays the lawyer to render legal 
services for another to direct or 
regulate the lawyer's professional 
judgment in rendering such legal 
services. 
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with 
or in the form of a professional 
corporation or association authorized 
to practice law for a profit, if: 
(1) a nonlawyer owns any 
interest therein, except that a 
fiduciary representative of the estate 
of a lawyer may hold the stock or 
interest of the lawyer for a 
reasonable time during 
administration; 
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate 
director or officer thereof or 
occupies the position of similar 
responsibility in any form of 
association other than a corporation; 
or 
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to 
direct or control the professional 
judgment of a lawyer. 
 
(d) the arrangement does not 
result in charging a fee that 
violates rule 1.5. 
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The Commission on Ethics 
20/20 Rule 5.4 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not 
share legal fees with a nonlawyer, 
except that:  
(1) an agreement by a lawyer 
with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or 
associate may provide for the 
payment of money, over a reasonable 
period of time after the lawyer’s 
death, to the lawyer's estate or to one 
or more specified persons;  
(2) a lawyer who purchases the 
practice of a deceased, disabled, or 
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the 
estate or other representative of that 
lawyer the agreed-upon purchase 
price;  
(3) a lawyer or law firm may 
include nonlawyer employees in a 
compensation or retirement plan, 
even though the plan is based in 
whole or in part on a profit-sharing 
arrangement; and  
(4) a lawyer or law firm may do 
so pursuant to paragraph (b); and  
(5) a lawyer may share court-
awarded legal fees with a nonprofit 
organization that employed, retained 
or recommended employment of the 
lawyer in the matter.  
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a 
law firm in which individual 
nonlawyers in that firm hold a 
financial interest, but only if:  
(1) the firm’s sole purpose is 
providing legal services to clients;  
(2) the nonlawyers provide 
services that assist the lawyer or law 
firm in providing legal services to 
clients;  
(3) the nonlawyers state in 
writing that they have read and 
understand the Rules of Professional 
D.C. Rule 5.4 
 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not 
share legal fees with a nonlawyer, 
except that: 
(1) An agreement by a lawyer 
with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or 
associate may provide for the 
payment of money, over a reasonable 
period of time after the lawyer’s 
death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one 
or more specified persons; 
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to 
complete unfinished legal business of 
a deceased lawyer may pay to the 
estate of the deceased lawyer that 
proportion of the total compensation 
which fairly represents the 
servicescompensation that fairly 
represents the services rendered by 
the deceased lawyer. A lawyer who 
purchases the practice of a deceased, 
disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
1.17, pay to the estate or other 
representative of that lawyer the 
agreed-upon purchase price. 
(3) A lawyer or law firm may 
include nonlawyer employees in a 
compensation or retirement plan, 
even though the plan is based in 
whole or in part on a profit-sharing 
arrangement; 
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted 
in a partnership or other form of 
organization which meets the 
requirements of paragraph (b); and 
(5) A lawyer may share legal 
fees, whether awarded by a tribunal 
or received in settlement of a matter, 
with a nonprofit organization that 
employed, retained, or recommended 
employment of the lawyer in the 
matter and that qualifies under 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
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Conduct and agree in writing to 
undertake to conform their conduct to 
the Rules; 
(4) the lawyer partners in the law 
firm are responsible for these 
nonlawyers to the same extent as if 
the nonlawyers were lawyers under 
Rule 5.1;  
(5) the nonlawyers have no 
power to direct or control the 
professional judgment of a lawyer, 
and the financial and voting interests 
in the firm of any nonlawyer are less 
than the financial and voting interest 
of the individual lawyer or lawyers 
holding the greatest financial and 
voting interests in the firm, the 
aggregate financial and voting 
interests of the nonlawyers does not 
exceed [25%] of the firm total, and 
the aggregate of the financial and 
voting interests of all lawyers in the 
firm is equal to or greater than the 
percentage of voting interests 
required to take any action or for any 
approval;  
(6) the lawyer partners in the 
firm make reasonable efforts to 
establish that each nonlawyer with a 
financial interest in the firm is of 
good character, supported by 
evidence of the nonlawyer’s integrity 
and professionalism in the practice of 
his or her profession, trade or 
occupation, and maintain records of 
such inquiry and its results; and 
(7) compliance with the 
foregoing conditions is set forth in 
writing.  
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person 
who recommends, employs, or pays 
the lawyer to render legal services for 
another to direct or regulate the 
lawyer’s professional judgment in 
rendering such legal services.  
Revenue Code. 
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a 
partnership or other form of 
organization in which a financial 
interest is held or managerial 
authority is exercised by an 
individual nonlawyer who performs 
professional services which assist the 
organization in providing legal 
services to clients, but only if: 
(1) The partnership or 
organization has as its sole purpose 
providing legal services to clients; 
(2) All persons having such 
managerial authority or holding a 
financial interest undertake to abide 
by these Rules of Professional 
Conduct; 
(3) The lawyers who have a 
financial interest or managerial 
authority in the partnership or 
organization undertake to be 
responsible for the nonlawyer 
participants to the same extent as if 
nonlawyer participants were lawyers 
under Rule 5.1; 
(4) The foregoing conditions are 
set forth in writing. 
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person 
who recommends, employs, or pays 
the lawyer to render legal services for 
another to direct or regulate the 
lawyer’s professional judgment in 
rendering such legal services. 
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(d) A fiduciary representative of the 
estate of a lawyer may hold the stock 
or interest of the lawyer in a firm for 
a reasonable time during 
administration. 
 
 
IV.  THE CONSUMER-COMMERCIAL-CONTRACTUAL 
MODEL (CCC MODEL) 
 
Each of the models previously proposed has significant flaws, 
including confidentiality, imputation, and supervision. Unfortunately, the 
core of the problem is that past models do not easily unite multidisciplinary 
practice with the unique professional rules and culture of the American legal 
community. In contrast, this article proposes a model that incorporates both a 
liberalization of Rule 5.4 and a pragmatic approach to melding the model to 
address professionalism concerns and the unique contours of the American 
market and legal community. Part A states the main premises of the CCC 
Model and the text of the proposed rule itself. Part B discusses the rule and 
the ethical and practical problems the rule addresses. Part C briefly discusses 
the challenges and disadvantages of adopting the CCC Model. 
 
A. The CCC Model: Premise and Text 
 
The model is based on four premises: (a) there are significant 
concerns with incorporated law firms with non-lawyer shareholders (passive 
investment); (b) having Wal-Mart or Sears hire lawyers to work in “Wal-
Mart law firms” would not comport with the professional rules or lawyer’s 
image as a “profession”; (c) commercial entities are sophisticated and need 
access to lawyer/non-lawyer combinations of services while consumers 
cannot as easily understand such entities; and (d) ultra-contractarianism is a 
growing trend in business. 
The CCC Model for Rule 5.4 would amend sections (a)(4) and (b)–
(c) as follows: 
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other 
form of organization which meets the requirements of 
paragraph (b); and . . . . 
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or 
unincorporated business entity in which a financial interest 
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is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual 
nonlawyer, only if: 
(1) The partnership or other form of unincorporated 
business entity is designated a “Multidisciplinary Firm” 
by the Secretary of State of the partnership or 
unincorporated business entity’s state of organization. 
(2) All nonlawyers are active participants in the 
Multidisciplinary Firm. Active participant means that 
the individual nonlawyer actively provides professional, 
or other services on behalf of the Multidisciplinary Firm 
or is otherwise engaged in the day to day affairs of the 
Multidisciplinary Firm. Nonlawyers may not be 
organizations, entities, or solely investors or passive 
investors. 
(3) All persons, lawyers and nonlawyers, having such 
managerial authority or holding a financial interest 
undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional 
Conduct, except as specified in section (7). All rules 
including confidentiality, conflicts of interest, 
imputation, and advertising shall apply to nonlawyers 
and lawyers in a firm, subject to section (7). 
(4) Where a nonlawyer is subject to an ethical or 
professional code of conduct or State or Federal law 
(collectively “Nonlawyer Ethics Code”) by virtue of his 
or her profession, licensure, or similar affiliation, the 
nonlawyer shall be bound by both the Nonlawyers 
Ethics Code and these Rules of Professional Conduct. If 
the Nonlawyer Ethics Code and these Rules of 
Professional Conduct both address an issue, the 
nonlawyers shall follow the more restrictive rule. If the 
Nonlawyer Ethics Code and these Rules of Professional 
Conduct directly conflict, the nonlawyers shall, to the 
extent possible, seek guidance on a proper course of 
action from the relevant lawyer and nonlawyers 
professional ethics authorities. If the direct conflict 
involves a mandatory disclosure of information or client 
misconduct a nonlawyer must make under a Nonlawyer 
Ethics Code, the nonlawyer shall simultaneously make 
the disclosure and notify the legal disciplinary authority 
of the jurisdiction where the Multidisciplinary Firm is 
registered. The Multidisciplinary Firm shall also 
immediately withdraw from representing and providing 
services to the client. 
(5) All nonlawyers with a managerial or financial 
interest in the Multidisciplinary Firm agree to be subject 
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to the jurisdiction of the following state legal 
disciplinary authorities: 
(A) Disciplinary authority of the state of 
organization for the Multidisciplinary Firm; 
(B) For conduct in connection with a matter 
pending before a tribunal, the disciplinary 
authority of the tribunal and jurisdiction in 
which it sits, unless the tribunal’s rules 
provide otherwise. 
(6) The lawyers and nonlawyers who have a financial 
interest or managerial authority in the Multidisciplinary 
Firm undertake to be responsible for the lawyer and 
nonlawyers participants to the same extent as if 
nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rules 5.1–
5.3. 
(7) The following section applies only to Commercial 
Clients. A Commercial Client is any individual or entity 
which does not meet the definition of consumer in 
§ 1-201(11) of the UCC. A Commercial Client and the 
multidisciplinary entity may agree in a contract for 
representation or other written agreement, signed by 
both parties, to vary the application of these Professional 
Rules of Conduct with regard to nonlawyers in the 
Multidisciplinary Firm, provided that: 
(A) The work provided by the nonlawyers 
will not be used exclusively to assist with or 
in connection with legal services being 
provided to the Commercial Client; 
(B) The agreement does not violate any 
Nonlawyer Ethics Codes or these Rules of 
Professional Conduct; 
(C) The Commercial Client is advised in 
writing to seek independent legal counsel 
before signing the agreement; 
(D) The Commercial Client may not waive 
application of these Rules of Professional 
Conduct to lawyers involved in the 
provision of legal or nonlegal services in a 
Multidisciplinary Firm; 
(E) The Commercial Client and 
Multidisciplinary Firm may structure the 
representation of the client in any manner 
they see fit provided that the agreement and 
structure complies with all Nonlawyer 
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Ethics Codes; these Rules of Profession 
Conduct, and state and Federal Laws; and 
(F) If no agreement under this section has 
been made, the Multidisciplinary Firm’s 
representation and provision of services to 
the Commercial Client shall be governed by 
the provisions of section (8). 
(8) The following section applies only to Consumer 
Clients. A Consumer Client is an individual who meets 
the definition of consumer in § 1-201(11) of the UCC. 
The contract for representation between a Consumer 
Client and the Multidisciplinary Firm shall contain the 
following information: 
(A) A clear statement of the scope of the 
representation, including specific legal 
services and nonlegal services that may be 
provided to the Consumer Client; 
(B) A provision stating that the 
representation is being provided by a 
Multidisciplinary Firm and a brief 
description of the nonlegal services 
provided by nonlawyers in the firm; 
(C) A clause in bold, 14 font, stating that the 
nonlawyers and lawyers in the 
Multidisciplinary Firm are bound by these 
Rules of Professional Conduct in their 
representation or provision of all services, 
legal or nonlegal, to the Consumer Client; 
and 
(D) All other information required by Rule 
1.5 or these Rules of Professional Conduct. 
(9) A Certificate of Multidisciplinary Practice shall be 
filed with the Secretary of State and disciplinary 
authorities of the Multidisciplinary Firm’s state of 
organization. The Certificate shall contain: 
(A) The name of the partnership or 
organization; 
(B) The names of all nonlawyers with 
managerial or financial interests in the 
partnership or organization; 
(C) An affirmation by the Multidisciplinary 
firm and all nonlawyers in the firm that they 
will abide by the conditions set forth in Rule 
5.4(b)(1) through (b)(8) and Rule 5.4(c); 
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(D) An affirmation by all nonlawyers in the 
Multidisciplinary firm that they will not 
place limitations on, direct or otherwise 
interfere with the independent professional 
judgment of the lawyers in the firm. 
(E) A partnership or organization shall file 
an amendment to the Certificate of 
Multidisciplinary Practice within thirty (30) 
days of a nonlawyer with a managerial or 
financial interest joining or disassociating 
from the firm. 
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, 
employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for 
another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional 
judgment in rendering such legal services.181 
 
B. The CCC Model Addresses Many Ethical and Practical 
Problems with Multidisciplinary Practices and Past Proposed 
Rules 5.4 
 
The CCC Model addresses many of the ethical and practical issues 
raised by liberalization of Model Rule 5.4 to allow multidisciplinary 
partnerships. Firstly, section (b)(2) requires that a nonlawyer who wishes to 
have a financial or managerial interest in a multidisciplinary firm be an 
individual and an active participant.182 The individual limitation reiterates the 
longstanding rule that lawyers (and now, by extension, nonlawyers), not law 
firms or other entities, are regulated by the legal professional bars.183 
Furthermore, restricting nonlawyers with managerial or financial interests to 
individuals also prevents business entities or organizations such as Walmart 
or Sears from holding interests in or operating multidisciplinary firms.184  
                                                 
181 Note that proposed sections (a)(4) and (c) are taken almost verbatim from 
current D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(4), 
(c). Additionally, all other existing sections of Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4, except 
those designated, would remain the same. 
182 CCC Model 5.4(b)(2). 
183 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (stating that, “A lawyer admitted 
to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, 
regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs,” but saying nothing about law firms); but see 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 489–532 (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf (describing federal sentencing 
guidelines for “organizations,” usually corporations, accused of crimes).  
184 See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text (describing the “Fear of 
Sears” problem and concerns that multidisciplinary firms operated by large corporations might 
drive smaller law firms out of business). 
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Similarly, the active participant limitation restricts nonlawyers in a 
multidisciplinary firm to active partnership and work for the firm.185 There is 
always a risk that non-lawyers will influence the independent professional 
judgment of lawyers in a multidisciplinary firm; but, the risk of such 
influence harming the client is lessened when nonlawyer managers or 
financial interests have an active stake in maintaining that client relationship 
and may even be providing services to the client, rather than simply holding 
a passive investment where the only concern is a monetary return.186 
Effectively, the risk of interference with lawyer independent judgment in the 
proposed multidisciplinary firm is no greater than that in a contemporary law 
firm or in-house legal department.187 Section (c) restates and reinforces the 
prohibition on interference in independent profession judgment by all 
persons who recommend, pay, or employ a lawyer.188 Presumably, this 
section’s prohibition would include, as does the current rule, interference by 
all persons, including other lawyers, nonlawyers, and third parties who pay 
for a client’s legal services.189 
However, unlike D.C. Rule 5.4 and the Commission on Ethics 20/20 
Rule 5.4, the CCC Model does not limit the services provided by a 
multidisciplinary firm to “legal services” and nonlawyer services assisting 
the provision of legal services.190 As a practical matter nonlawyers, 
                                                 
185 See supra notes 159–167 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Rule 5.4, 
which limits nonlawyer partners to active participation and work for the firm, although it does 
not expressly prohibit passive investment); supra Part III.C.2 (describing the Commission on 
Ethics 20/20’s suggested rule, which requires active participation by nonlawyers in the firm 
and limits services provided by the firm to legal services to further that requirement). 
186 See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (describing passive 
investment and lawyer independence of judgment); supra notes 64–80 (explaining the 
business-profession dichotomy and the concern that multidisciplinary practice may make the 
legal profession focused on profit, rather than provision of better client services). 
187 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (stating that law firms, in-house 
legal departments, and insurance company payment of lawyers on behalf of the insured 
already raise lawyer independence of judgment concerns, but are still permitted under the 
professional rules). 
188 See ELIZABETH BENNETT ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 284–85 (7th ed. 2011) (discussing the prohibition on third party and insurance 
interference in the independent professional judgment of the lawyer under Rule 2.1); CCC 
Model 5.4(c). 
189 See supra notes 117–125 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer 
independence of judgment); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. 2 
(explaining that existing Model Rule 5.4(c) reinforces the prohibition on third parties 
interfering with the lawyer’s professional judgment in Model Rule 1.8). Section (c) is an exact 
copy of current Model Rule 5.4(c) in most states, and thus, at least presumably would be 
interpreted by state disciplinary authorities and courts the same way as it has been in the past. 
Id. 
190 See supra notes 159–167 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. 
limitation that permits nonlawyers in a lawyer/nonlawyer entity to provide services ancillary 
to the provision of legal services, but not to have clients and provide services unattached from 
the provision of legal services); ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10–13 (describing 
the Commission on Ethics 20/20 limitation on services provided in an ALPS to legal services). 
33
Groth: Protecting the Profession
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014
598 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:565 
particularly highly skilled professionals, are unlikely to accept working only 
for clients receiving legal services when they will be compensated highly for 
their client roster by a nonlawyer business firm.191 Additionally, the CCC 
Model contains no percentage limitation on the interests nonlawyers may 
hold in a multidisciplinary firm.192 Instead, the CCC Model protects client 
interests by requiring different initial disclosures by multidisciplinary firms 
for consumer clients versus commercial clients, as discussed below.193 
Sections (b)(3) through (b)(6) address whether nonlawyers in a 
multidisciplinary firm are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, a 
point of frequent concern among practitioners and client protection 
advocates.194 The rule lays out the unambiguous rule that nonlawyers are 
subject to the state professional rules of the jurisdiction in which the 
multidisciplinary firm is organized, unless waived in specific circumstances 
by a commercial client.195 Furthermore, section (b)(4) addresses the 
circumstances where a nonlawyer ethics code governs the conduct of a 
nonlawyer in a multidisciplinary firm, a point not addressed by past proposed 
rules.196 Section (b)(4) adopts a client and public protectionist approach. It 
requires nonlawyers to comply with the most restrictive rule and make 
mandatory disclosures under the Rules of Professional Conduct, a state 
statute, or other nonlawyer code of ethics even when another ethics code 
prohibits such disclosures.197 Thus, nonlawyers cannot hide behind the 
Professional Rules of Conduct as an excuse not to make disclosures required 
by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or other statutes.198 
                                                 
191 Interview with Michael Roberts, Business Consultant, Mahto Wacipi Ltd., in 
Saint Paul, Minn. (Sep. 15, 2013) (discussing his work as a business consultant for a number 
of corporations and firms, where he is effectively paid to a great extent for his network 
connections, like many other nonlawyer business professionals and lawyers). 
192 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10–13 (proposing a twenty-five 
percent cap on nonlawyer interests held in an ALPS); see supra notes 145–158 and 
accompanying text (discussing the British ABS and the twenty-five percent nonlawyer 
limitation). 
193 ALPS December Letter, supra note 8, at 10–13 (stating that the limitation on 
the percentage of a law firm held by nonlawyers is meant to protect clients). The ALPS 
December Letter provides no support for its assertion that having nonlawyers limited to a 
certain percentage ownership interest will protect client interests. Id.; See infra notes 199–201 
(laying out the commercial versus consumer client disclosure differences in the CCC Model).  
194 See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text (explaining that most 
practitioners agree that nonlawyers should be subject to the legal Rules of Professional 
Conduct when providing services ancillary to legal services, but that practitioners are divided 
on whether those rules should apply to all services, law-related or nonlegal, that a nonlawyer 
provides). 
195  CCC Model 5.4(b)(3). 
196 Supra Part III (discussing proposed Rule 5.4 models, with no mention of 
nonlawyer codes of ethics and conflict between legal codes of conduct and nonlawyer ethics 
codes); CCC Model 5.4(b)(4). 
197  CCC Model 5.4(b)(4). 
198 See supra note 73 (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
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A unique feature of the proposed CCC Model, though, is the 
distinction drawn between commercial clients and consumer clients in 
sections (b)(7) and (b)(8). The separate treatment of the two groups of clients 
is necessary for two reasons. First, the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Conduct already treats representation of an entity differently than 
representation of an individual client.199 The consumer-commercial client 
distinction merely expands the ABA Model Code treatment of the lawyer-
entity relationship to specify that representation of a sophisticated 
businessperson in the functions of a business should be treated differently 
than representation of an individual accused of a crime or obtaining a 
divorce. Secondly, consumer protection and differentiation between 
commercial and consumer transactions is a growing trend.200 For example, 
many states differentiate between commercial entities and consumers for real 
estate disclosures, UCC secured transactions, and consumer credit 
lawsuits.201  
Furthermore, sections (b)(7) and (b)(8) adopt a mixed ultra-
contractarianism approach.202 Ultra-contractarianism or simply 
contractarianism refers to the modern trend in unincorporated business 
statutes that allow incorporators, organizers, partners, etc. . . . to modify by 
“contract” the default rules to suit the business’s needs.203 Section (b)(7), 
applicable only to commercial clients, extends this trend by allowing 
commercial clients and MPDs to contractually structure their relationship as 
they see fit.204 As John S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni recognized, 
                                                 
199 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (governing the representation 
of entities by lawyers). 
200 MINN. STAT. § 336.9-102(a)(22), (26) (2013) (defining consumer debtor and 
consumer transactions for purposes of secured transactions); MINN. STAT. § 491A.01 (2013) 
(stating that the Minnesota Conciliation Court jurisdiction is limited to certain “consumer 
credit transactions”); MINN. STAT. § 513.52 (2013) (noting residential real estate versus 
commercial property specialized seller disclosure requirements); see also William D. Warren 
& Steven D. Walt, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 34, 49, 311 (9th ed. 2013) 
(discussing consumer and nonconsumer debtor and transaction differences in Article 9 
treatment including after-acquired property, automatic perfection, and strict foreclosure). 
201 See supra note 200. 
202 See CCC Model 5.4(b)(7)–(8). 
203 Daniel S. Kleinberger, Careful What You Wish For—Freedom of Contract and 
the Necessity of Careful Scrivening, 5 ESOURCE 6, 19–23 (Dec. 2006), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0054/materials/pp7.pdf (discussing 
Delaware’s contractarianist approach to corporation and unincorporated business entity 
statutes ); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (e) (West 2013). Delaware’s LLC and 
corporation statutes are a prime example of this “ultra-contractarianism” trend. Delaware 
statutes permit incorporators or organizers to completely eliminate officer, manager, or 
director duty of loyalty through the articles of incorporation, bylaws, management agreement, 
or similar contract; REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 110, 
cmt. subsection (d), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/ 
limited%20liability%20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf (referencing the ultra-contractarianism 
trend). 
204 CCC Model 5.4(b)(7). 
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“[t]he premise in allowing a single entity MDP is that professionals should 
be free to structure the entity in whatever way best serves the clients.”205 This 
rationale also extends to flexibility in structuring the multidisciplinary firm’s 
relationship with its commercial clients to better meet the needs of that client 
base, while providing meaningful default protections to consumer clients. 
Additionally, the rule addresses practical concerns. First, section 
(b)(1) gives an entity with both lawyers and nonlawyers holding financial or 
managerial interests a name, the multidisciplinary firm. The 
multidisciplinary firm designation distinguishes the entity from law firms or 
ABSs and covers all business entity forms employed by law firms.206 
Second, section (b)(9) requires that a Certificate of Multidisciplinary Practice 
be filed with the Secretary of State of the multidisciplinary firm’s state of 
organization. This ensures that a state government has a record of such 
entities, and the nonlawyers practicing in those entities, for purposes of 
regulation.207 It is also possible that this registration could be used to better 
regulate nonlawyer professionals and ensure that unethical nonlawyers are 
not permitted to practice in multidisciplinary firms.208 Lastly, the CCC 
Model’s choice of law provisions, contained in section (b)(5) also provides 
nonlawyers clarity regarding where they may be subject to discipline under 
the Rules of Professional Conduct and, thus, which rules they must follow.209 
Overall, many of the provisions of the CCC Model make multidisciplinary 
practice more predictable and less risky.210 
 
                                                 
205 Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 1, at 170–72. 
206 See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text (discussing the different 
terminology used to refer to entities in which lawyers and nonlawyers practice and the 
resulting confusion). 
207 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining the regulation of 
multidisciplinary entities in the United Kingdon, where multidisciplinary entities are required 
to register as ABSs) 
208 See supra note 69 (discussing licensing of engineers, certified public 
accountants, and other “business professionals” by many states, including Wisconsin and New 
York). 
209 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ANN. R. 8.2, 8.5 (including comments). 
The comparable provision for lawyers is contained in Model Rule 8.5, governing choice of 
law. However, unlike Model Rule 8.2, the choice of law provision governing nonlawyers only 
subjects them to discipline in two states, the state of organization of the multidisciplinary firm 
and the rules of any tribunal involved in a case for which a nonlawyer provided services. 
Since nonlawyers would not otherwise be subject to the jurisdictional powers of a state’s legal 
disciplinary authority, but for the fact that they provide services in a multidisciplinary firm, 
this limiting of jurisdictional and disciplinary powers to certain defined and specific locations 
and rules makes sense. Additionally, the rule provides that nonlawyers waive the right to 
object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal on personal jurisdiction grounds. This effectively 
shortens the time needed to regulate and litigate these fee disputes. CCC Model 5.4(b)(5). 
210 See supra note 165 and accompanying text (describing the unknown ethical 
and liability considerations of multidisciplinary practice as a risk management hazard and 
practical problem inhibiting the growth of multidisciplinary practices in D.C., particularly 
since nonlawyers may only partner with lawyers in that jurisdiction). 
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C. Challenges with Adopting the CCC Model 
 
Despite its numerous benefits, there are some challenges to adopting 
the CCC Model. The rule necessarily contemplates that Rules 1.7 through 
1.13 governing conflicts of interest and imputation of conflicts of interest 
will be amended.211 Such amendments would be needed to clarify rules 
applying to conflicts of interest with past clients, including what is meant by 
“materially adverse.”212 Amendments may also allow greater use of 
screening, rather than complete disqualification of the multidisciplinary firm 
from providing services to a client. Screening is already used, with great 
success, for government employees.213 
Another particularly tricky area is when nonlawyers in a 
multidisciplinary firm are bound by codes of conduct or federal or state laws 
specific to their profession, licensure, etc.214 The CCC Model approaches 
that conflict by adopting a “client protection” mindset and requiring the 
nonlawyer to follow the most restrictive rule.215 Additionally, the CCC 
Model requires that nonlawyers adhere to the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of their business or profession. Such adherence is again in the 
best interests of the public and clients. However, depending on the nature of 
the conflict between the lawyer professional rules and the nonlawyer ethics 
code, this approach may be overly simple or need modification to comport 
with the practical realities of practice. 
Finally, given that multidisciplinary practice has been rejected 
several times in the years since the adoption of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct in 1983, it is an open question whether the organized 
bar will accept such a liberal form of Model Rule 5.4.216 This is especially 
true given that the Commission on Ethics 20/20 proposed rule is far more 
restrictive than the CCC Model.217 Nevertheless, on the whole, the CCC 
Model provides a strong alternative to other models proposed in the past 
                                                 
211 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.9; Carson, supra note 65, at 
618–20 (describing the problems of conflicts of interest in the multidisciplinary firm, as a 
rationale for rejecting the form). 
212 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.9 (conflicts of interest); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.  1.10–1.12 (imputing conflicts of interest and screening 
of government employees). 
213 BENNETT ET AL., supra note 188, at 184–85, 194–95. Current Rule 1.10 allows 
screening in the lateral hire context when the disqualification is based on Rule 1.9(a) or (b). 
As commentators have recognized, screening is necessary to avoid the harsh consequences of 
imputed conflicts of interest when a lawyer previously performed government work. Id. at 
194–95. Those harsh consequences may also provide a rationale for employing screening in 
the nonlawyer conflicts context as well, particularly where larger firms with multiple offices 
are involved. Id. 
214 See CCC Model § 5.4(b)(5) (describing the state professional rules to which 
nonlawyers would be subject). 
215 CCC Model § 5.4(b)(5). 
216 See supra Part II. 
217 See supra Part III.C.2. 
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thirty years and is a solution that the ABA should seriously consider 
reviewing. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Given the momentum of the rapidly changing legal market and the 
growth of legal services providers, it is only a matter of time before the ABA 
is forced to confront the issue of multidisciplinary practices.218 The 
tremendous history of failed attempts at reform and recent developments 
overseas give the ABA multiple models and ethical challenges to consider.219 
The CCC Model provides the best proposal for such reform and addresses 
significant issues, such as disciplinary authority over nonlawyers, 
professional rule conflicts of laws, and additional client protections for 
commercial versus consumer clients.220 Above all, the CCC Model 
introduces structured flexibility into American multidisciplinary structures, 
where other proposed models have been too rigid to be practical.221 
In the end, as Elijah D. Farrell has recognized, “resolution of the 
current dissonance may be “driven less by lawyers’ own notions of ethical 
propriety than by the demands of clients in the modern global 
marketplace.”222 Let us hope that reform comes through the contractual pen 
and consumer-commercial contrast, rather than through inaction or overly 
restrictive regulation. 
                                                 
218 See generally Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 3 (discussing the rapidly 
changing legal marketplace); Hackett, supra note 109 (describing current trends toward legal 
service providers and the quick shift to more technology-based forms of providing legal 
services). 
219 See supra Parts II–III. 
220 See supra Part IV. 
221 See supra Part IV; see also supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 Model). 
222 Farrell, supra note 62, at 627–28. 
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